In step with predominant international paradigms of statebuilding and peacebuilding, however, prevailing representations of the state and nation -of the political life of TimorLeste -focus almost entirely on state institutions and the state elite (or threats to these i stitutio s . Othe d a i s of po e appea at est as si pl ultu al , to e a aged within the terms of the bureaucratic-legal state. Such an approach remains deeply e t e hed i te atio all despite the lo al tu i so e theo eti al a d to a lesse e te t policy discussion (OECD, 2010; Denney, 2013) . This article argues that by failing to ade uatel a k o ledge othe o st u tio s of power and appropriate action as genuine sources and shapers of political community, state-centric approaches place more local, community understandings of power outside serious exchange, negotiation or scrutiny; they e o e hidde i plai ie . Mo eo e , this overlooking becomes an obstacle to efforts to understand and negotiate the interactions of different constructions of power, value and wealth, and their effects on leadership, institutions, governance and lives. In many parts of the post-colonial world, friction and confusion between liberal and customary modes of governance has created ambiguous zones governed neither by customary nor bureaucraticlegal patterns of accountability, hidden from scrutiny and rife with opportunistic manipulation and violence (Boege et al., 2009; Ellis and ter Haar, 2004) .
The co-existence of governance norms is a profound challenge, but not in itself the problem. Rather, it is the particula atu e a d effe ts of the e olog of elatio s (Descola, 2013) created by their interaction that is important -what dynamics of power are enabled, who is excluded, and whether relations are shaped in ways that are relatively open to discussion and exchange or unacknowledged and unaccountable. The nature of political community in Timor-Leste and the character of its operation as a state are likely to be fundamentally shaped by how these interweaving logics of governance play out and are mobilised by various interests. Moreover, these engagements are important not only for central government, but are in play perhaps even more intensely at the community level, in villages (Cummins, forthcoming) . Processes of discussion and exchange around particular, concrete arenas of interaction could give substance to nation-building endeavours and to the democratic values of participation, accountability and respect which Timor-Leste has constitutionally embraced. In this context it is important to take prevailing community and customary values seriously, as genuine sources of political life, and to take villages seriously, as ke sites of e e gi g go e a e p a ti e a d as fu da e tal to people s e pe ie e a d
well-being.
This article is a reflection on the gulfs, tensions and enmeshments of customary and liberal values and practices, with an emphasis on the village. After a comment on terms, it situates the discussion by looking briefly at the emergence of the new state of Timor-Leste. It notes the disjunction between centralised, liberal institutional and community approaches to governance but also considers the strengths and weaknesses of efforts to manage this disjunction: elections, consultation processes, the role of socio-political goods, and some local community efforts. Given the importance of villages to emerging political community, the article then discusses aspects of customary and community life. Village elections are an example both of the growing enmeshment of different approaches to governance and an indication of the diversity of the accommodations reached. Custom can itself be understood as an expression of self-determination. The article then returns to a broader discussion of the e ile of usto f o ho the state a d, i pli atio , politi al o u it a e o o l conceptualised. It reflects on more relational and dynamic approaches to understanding the state and emphasizes the challenge and importance of processes of engagement and exchange to building political community across radical difference.
Constructing this argument in terms of state institutional and customary governance itself risks repeating the reification of categories, when it is more often a dynamic fusion of various elements that shapes realities on the ground. Drawing attention to community and customary values, however, is a response to the often pejorative or slight treatment they receive. Customary world-views and practices are understood here as dynamic and multidimensional, with long histories of resilience, refashioning, jettisoning and incorporation (McWilliam, 2005 (McWilliam, , 2008 . Liberal governance also constitutes a family of p otea a d o te di g app oa hes. Lo al is a ope -ended term (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010) . It refers first to the local governance of the suku (village). In rural areas, it is the suku that deals with day-to-day security and livelihood and where most East Timorese have direct experience of governance. The suku is a fundamental point of reference for political community in Timor-Leste and a critical site of enmeshment of customary and state institutional governance. While forms of suku governance vary across the country (Gusmão, 2012) , in important respects the significance of suku go e a e is o e atio al tha that of the central government as it is local values and mechanisms that underpin social and politi al o de ou t ide. Lo al also poi ts to usto a alues a d p a ti es, hi h a e lo al i the se se of ei g of the pla e -endogenous but also pervasive and far-reaching, with considerable diversity across the country, but sharing strong patterns of family resemblance. To be local, however, does not mea that illages o usto a e spatiall incarcerated, existing in a realm other than or isolated from global, international or national dynamics (Appadurai, 1988 in Shaw and Waldorf, 2012: 6) .
The New State of Timor-Leste
Independence is a recent and hard-won achievement for Timor-Leste. Statehood and centralised government are the available way to assert independence in the international system, and for many Timorese they symbolise rejection of the oppression and violence of the Indonesian era and stand as assertions of self-determination and hope. Many Timorese made great personal sacrifice for the 1999 vote that led to independence. Perhaps reflecting this there is a very high level of participation in national elections. Since formal independence Timor-Leste has held two rounds of national elections and witnessed one change of government -a significant achievement. The state itself could be seen as a statement of independence and of being Timorese, and people want to be part of it (McWilliam and Bexley, 2009 ).
In keeping with prevailing international practice, state-building in Timor-Leste, first under the UN (UNTAET) and then national governments, has been highly centralised (Chopra, 2002; Soux et al., 2007) . Responding to the scale of destruction in 1999, the international community and the returning East Timorese diaspora saw the task ahead as nothing less than building a new nation from almost zero (UNDP, 2000: 92) . This challenge inspired extraordinary efforts by the East Timorese elite and the international community to construct a modern state -an effort focussed squarely on building the machinery of government (Richmond and Franks, 2008 It may not only be a matter of resources then that state institutions continue to have little reach beyond the capital, and that there is a deep disconnection between urban and rural life (Toome et al., 2012) . In practice, in Timor-Leste, few established structures underpin liberal o s, o suppo t thei i teg atio i to people s e pe ie e, although the ha e so e circulation particularly, though not only, in urban areas, and can be passionately held.
Confusion between liberal and customary social orders has also been a challenge for Dili, as the material and social frameworks that might in practice support liberal forms of social order are relatively undeveloped (Valenti, 2014) , while high rates of urban migration mean that kinship mechanisms are relatively weak (Trinidade and Castro, 2007) .
Democratic inclusion into the exchanges that make up national political community has been approached largely in terms of elections. Timorese clearly welcome the opportunity to participate in the choice of leadership (Toome et al., 2012) . Nevertheless, national elections e ai a thi fo of e gage e t. Elections in themselves do not link the operation of leadership with the concerns, needs and values of the community, and are not capable of bridging the disjunction of local and bureaucratic-legal institutions (Hohe, 2002b; dos Santos and da Silva, 2012) . Elections open the door to wider sets of exchanges and forms of accountability necessary for more substantive legitimacy. Without these exchanges, the legitimating power of elections could weaken. The Government also undertakes public consultation processes; however, consultation periods are usually short and little information is disseminated beforehand (Wallis, 2012: 11) . The challenges of creating inclusive processes of exchange, not driven by specific government policy agendas, are significant (Tully, 1995) .
Institutions such as justice systems can work to bind political community together, but they can also be fractured. For example, according to standard explanations, criminal or serious cases go to court in Timor-Leste, while minor cases are dealt with by custom.
However, as one District Administrator explained, i ealit the justi e s ste does t o k, so e ust use t aditio al ethods for both [serious and minor crimes], and this has deep roots in society -it is from our ancestors ... [and] is more effective … gi e that the justi e s ste is so eak, let s use the t aditio al s ste . Now … the crime statistics are very low … It is not because there are no problems but because we use traditional houses to resolve them. ( There are other examples (McWilliam, 2008; Palmer and de Carvalho, 2008; Cummins, forthcoming) . Deeper forms of articulation may emerge from these developments over time.
Customary Orders and the Suku
Suku have adapted over centuries to fundamental changes of political regime. The great diversity of suku reflects cultural, linguistic and geographic difference, but also regional variations in this history of adaptation. The village, including the sub-village (aldeia) and the family, is the principal arena for customary forms of governance. If central government institutions have relatively little reach into the regions, suku, and the clan networks upon which they largely rest, underpin social order, food production and well-being for most
Timorese. Central government, however, also reaches the rural population largely through
suku.
Timor-Leste is largely rural, with over 70 per cent of the population dependent upon subsistence food production in a difficult natural environment. In rural areas, most people live in small, scattered, kin-based communities at sub-village level or below. Despite some provision of services by church, government, or other agencies, these are fundamentally self-help communities (Grenfell et al., 2009) . Customary belief systems are embedded in extended family life, giving them power, durability and reach. Kinship is structured through uma o houses , hi h a e tied i te all to pla e a d sha ed a esto s, a d et o ked through patterns of reciprocal obligation flowing from intermarriage. Uma includes living relatives, but also those who have died and the yet unborn; it includes the natural world, but also spirits (McWilliam, 2005 (Gusmão, 2012; Scott, 1998) .
In more traditional villages, agricultural, cultural and kinship cycles shape much social order (McWilliam, 2008) . Being elected to office does not always ensure authority in these contexts, and in some villages local leaders without liurai [traditional authority] heritage have had difficulty maintaining their authority in carrying out their daily activities (Pereira and Koten, 2012: 227) . This is a challenge also faced by women elected to suku councils.
Although it is not common, women can hold substantial leadership roles, including suku chief, but their standing comes through other sources, whether lineage or standing in the resistance (Cummins, 2010 Nevertheless, elected leadership is not necessarily associated with higher levels of participation -in some villages elected leadership was considered to have reduced participation (Periera and Koten, 2012; Tilman, 2012) . The view that the suku chief no longer worked for or was answerable to the whole community but distributed resources only to his or her electors (or family) contributed to lack of participation and cooperation (interviews 2011; Cummins, forthcoming). Party competition (no longer allowed in direct form at village level) was also often a divisive factor (Gusmão, 2012) .
These competing demands and circumstances generate notably different accommodations -although accommodation is not always reached. A small number of communities simply elect their traditional liurai as suku chief (e.g., in Viqueque and Oecusse).
It is more common, however, to wrap up the old system in the new, for customary authorities to identify leaders who will work closely with them, who a e the o fi ed through a voting process (dos Santos and da Silva, 2012; McWilliam, 2008) . Customary authorities may si pl a oi t the o u it s hoi e, ha di g po e fo all to the elected chief, and collaborating drawing on different bases of legitimacy. This action is not a formal gesture for a secular society, but a ritual endowing of authority that carries meaning for the community (Gusmão, 2012 
Building the State
The co-existence of different logics of governance shapes many states. It is a fundamental factor in post-olo ial e pe ie e a d fo s the o te t of u h de elop e t Bake a d (Tully, 1995; Smith, 2005; Fukuyama, 2011) . Tradition becomes by definition the dark past left behind in a mythic narrative of progress. The political point of narrative arrival is the state, particularly the modern liberal state, and the dichotomy of irrational tradition and enlightened modernity is embedded in popular representations of the state. There is no suggestion here that this dichotomy should be turned on its head, so that tradition should be seen as positive and the modern state as negative. Rather, it is the automatic normative presumption, the essentialized atego ies a d the atu alised a ati e t aje to f o da k ess to light that a e eje ted. "t u tu es a d a ts justified t aditio a e iole t a d opp essi e, as a those ide tified ith ode it 'i ha ds, . No is this a relativist position -one can have, and political communities need to develop, criteria and methods for judging and dealing with practices, but this needs to be done on the basis of acknowledging and engaging across different moral cosmologies of governance (Tully, 1995; Brown, 2002 Thus development and peacebuilding efforts, whether from donor or post-colonial capitals, have repeatedly overlooked locally-based approaches to governance, not seeing them as relevant to modern political community. Or they have categorised them as threats to the state that need to be expunged (Fukuyama, 2011) . Or states have attempted to incorporate but also instrumentalize local forms of governance, with little attention to the effects of that incorporation on customary governance or on state institutions and processes.
In this approach state institutions constitute the dominant, overarching domain of politics and the public good, while customary governance is seen as the domain of (largely rural) society -familial, small-scale and parochial (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010) . This account conveys an aspiration, but may obscure more than it reveals. It does not provide a way of thinking seriously about the complexities of political life across radical discontinuity: about the play of power, the distribution of resources, and the determination of relevant values and shared forms of accountability. As yet, there is no shared way of talking about these interactions, the contexts in which they arise and the political and institutional dynamics they generate, that is in any way adequate to the effects they generate.
For donors, even when the role of customary governance in the provision of social goods has been acknowledged, engaging with non-state bodies tends to be seen as too problematic. For the Department for International Development (DFID), for example, the challenges of engagement revolve around the illiberal character of some informal actors a d DFID s li e al u eau ati atu e, hi h p edisposes it to e tai fo s of e gage e t that privilege the state and simultaneously problematize informal actors, including chiefs (Denney, 2013:6) . The result of such approaches, however, is to sideline questions of whether, how and what order, security, justice, accountability or participation is provided and by whom, and to not explore the potential for constructive engagement (dos Santos and da Silva, 2012; Baker and Scheye, 2007) .
The working assumption has been that state institutions are the sources of political order.
As a result, the international community has emphasized transferring or strengthening the institutional architecture seen as key to states and elections (Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005) .
According to this (broadly Weberian) understanding, the state is identified with the institutions of government and law, which are taken to be distinct from, but ordering of, society. As Tanje Hohe commented regarding the early UN mission in Timor-Leste, the Transitional Administration built institutions based on the assumption that there were no strong concepts and ideas existing on the local level, and that the population just had to be taught democracy (Hohe, 2002a: 570) . Whatever the applicability of such approaches to states where government and societal institutions already share a political culture, they are inadequate to questions of state and nation formation, particularly across profound difference.
A political community could rather be understood as an effect of the relationships between state institutions, societal institutions, and social orders (Cudworth, Hall and McGovern, 2007) . As Marc Galanter notes, commenting on the transfer of legal institutions,
[j]ust as health is not found primarily in hospitals or knowledge in schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice-dispensing institutions (Galanter, 1981: 3) . Rather it is the relationships between the legal architecture and the institutions, cultures, traditions, mores and practices in which this architecture operates that establish a working form of justice (Krygier and Mason, 2008: 5) . The formal political, economic and legal institutions work in large part because they are embedded in networks of social practice, which institutions in turn help to regulate. Reducing the state to key institutions and state formation to institutional transfer means that little attention is given to how these institutions might relate to their socio-political context or build relationships with already existing bodies and practices. It encourages the centralization of power and resources in the capital, and state processes that have little reason to look outwards. While the generic framework of an institution may indeed be imported, however, the processes and relationships by which it engages with its context -by which it reshapes and is reshaped by local understandings of community (or health or justice, etcetera) or is drawn into existing political dynamics -are critical to what kind of work that institution will do and what effects it will have (Boege et al., 2009 ).
Engagement and Relationship
Working across different logics of governance and constructions of power generates Canadians, participatory political life in regions marked by deeply different constructions of political community requires conscious dialogue between and across life-worlds (Tully, 1995; Connolly, 2000) . Engagement, in this context, requires much more than the usual efforts at popula o sultatio , he e state age ies o o l hea i put o l a o di g to thei own frames of reference (Tully, 1995; Brown, 2002) . Internationally, there is a long history of the marginalisation and systemic overlooking of endogamous, community-based forms of social order by state structures (Smith, 2005) .
It is not only participation and inclusion, however, which require conscious engagement.
The intersection of divergent logics of accountability and obligation bears directly on issues of corruption; different expectations of legitimacy and authority affect the exercise of leadership; approaches to political order that exclude large sections of the population will encourage division, impoverishment, insecurity and corruption, and so on (Brown, 2009 ).
The enmeshment of logics of governance shapes the kinds of practices that predominate, whether formally, informally or more deeply hidden from view. It is often not clear beforehand ho these logi s affe t a d eshape ea h othe s fu tio i p a ti e (Cummins, 2010) . The effort to replace customary forms of decision-making and accountability with bureaucratic-legal approaches, for example, can contribute to the erosion of customary decision-making, without supplying genuinely authoritative, locally legitimate, or wellunderstood alternatives (Ellis and der Haar, 2004; Pereira and Koten, 2012) . Bureaucraticlegal and local forms of governance also generate their own forms of exclusion that are as likely to compound as to neutralise each other (Cummins, 2010) . That is, there is an ecology of relations taking shape which is not described either by liberal institutional or customary terms of reference. The dynamics of power that emerge within this ecology of relationships will determine who and what is enabled or excluded in different arenas of activity. Whether these interactions are explored and negotiated through unacknowledged shadow zones or through more accessible forms of exchange will be critically important to the nature of political community in Timor-Leste.
This kind of dialogue across difference does not sit easily with the processes and demands for certainty of most central government operations. It is a profound challenge for state institutions to enter into two-a e ha ges, o u s ipted o e satio s that i ol e liste i g e o d the o fi es of sta da dised f a e o ks, athe tha deli e i g essages to supposedly compliant populations (Duffield, 2007) . Nevertheless, there is likely to be a great cost to not persisting in this slow, uncertain work. For in Timor-Leste, much of the justice, social welfare and food security upon which the contemporary state depends is underpinned, not by institutions of government, but through largely customary forms of authority (Grenfell et al., 2009 
Conclusion
Much of the political trauma in post-colonial regions may be generated in the shadow world between the structures of state power and the reality of communities. Thinking about the political community of the state could instead begin with the networks of relationships linking social orders, institutions, and norms, of which state institutions are part. This shift of perspective brings into focus a different range of questions and emphases. It foregrounds the need to pay attention to the realities of communities and to engage seriously with them.
It emphasizes building a shared language of political community, in the context of negotiation around values, practices and social and political goods. For Timor-Leste, it means taking sukus seriously, not merely as recipients of services or of a statebuilding project, but as central to political community, and it means paying attention to customary governance.
As José Magno and António Coa have noted, democracy is grounded in the community, and communities live withi thei ultu e (Magno and Coa, 2012: 173) .
Customary governance is not incipient liberalism; to take custom seriously might seem to entail a weakening of values, such as human rights, that many seek in liberal statehood.
Experience indicates, however, that customary practices, while conservative, are not static, but can be creative and adaptable. Some customary practices would and should be challenged by efforts to work against violence and marginalisation. Pursuing human rights, however, also includes acknowledging indigenous and collective rights, and so entering into the slow, difficult exchanges that seek to work against violence while engaging seriously with local norms, practices and circumstances (Tully, 1995; Brown, 2002) . It is important not to romanticise customary life, but it is equally important not to idealise liberal institutions (Brown, 1995 
